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In March 2009, Columbia FDI Perspectives carried an early analysis of investment policies in 
response to the financial crisis that began in early 2008.1 At that time, the authors, Anne van Aaken and 
Jürgen Kuntz, found “clear evidence of widespread discrimination directed at foreign actors” in the 
emergency response to the crisis.  
One year on, OECD analysis suggests a more nuanced assessment of investment policy making 
during the crisis. The findings of a series of OECD reports2 tracking investment policy trends in 49 
developed and emerging markets since November 2008 challenge the wholesale claim that investment 
policy measures taken during the crisis were driven by a protectionist agenda involving significant 
discrimination against foreign investors. However, in the current context, the OECD inventory of 
investment measures also shows that crisis response and exit policies (that is, policies that unwind crisis 
response measures) pose a major threat to the openness of international investment. 
 
Fears of a destructive spiral of investment protection and retaliationhave not materialized  
As the crisis deepened in 2008, fears took hold of a destructive cycle of protectionist and retaliatory 
policies of the type experienced in earlier deep crises3. In retrospect, these fears proved largely 
unfounded. General investment measures – those not covered by national security or crisis exceptions – 
                                                 
*
 Kathryn Gordon (kathryn.gordon@oecd.org) and Joachim Pohl (joachim.pohl@oecd.org) are officials in the 
Investment Division of the OECD. The authors wish to thank Anne van Aaken, Ted Posner, and an anonymous 
reviewer for their helpful comments on this Perspective. The views expressed by the individual authors of this 
Perspective do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the OECD, Columbia University or their partners and 
supporters. Columbia FDI Perspectives is a peer-reviewed series. 
1
 Anne van Aaken and Jürgen Kurtz, “The Global Financial Crisis: Will State Emergency Measures Trigger 
International Investment Disputes?” Columbia FDI Perspectives No.3, March 23, 2009. 
2
 The reports are available at www.oecd.org/daf/investment/foi.  A series reports on G20 trade and investment 
policies jointly produced by the WTO, OECD and UNCTAD are also available at this address. 
3
  See “Keeping markets open at times of crisis” OECD Policy Brief April 2009 for a discussion of protectionist 
risks and appropriate investment policies during economic crises. 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/18/44/42446696.pdf 
taken since the outbreak of the global crisis point, with few exceptions, toward greater openness and 
transparency for foreign investors. Governments streamlined investment review procedures, loosened 
limits on foreign ownership in domestic companies and abolished monopolies that had previously limited 
foreign investments. The OECD found several dozen general investment measures, of which only a few 
restrict inward or outward investment. 
 
Crisis measures have pervasive impacts on inward and outward capital flows  
While general investment policy changes tended to promote international investment, the many crisis 
response measures that governments introduced to rescue or support companies bear significant potential 
for discrimination against foreign investors. Except for a few emerging markets, almost all countries in 
the OECD inventory established such schemes since late 2008, and new measures were still being 
introduced in early 2010. A conservative OECD estimate found that, by September 2009, G20 
governments alone had made combined public expenditure commitments of more than USD 3 trillion to 
assist companies in difficulty – roughly USD 10 billion per day on average since the dramatic deepening 
of the crisis in autumn 2008. By early 2010, several thousand companies had received financial support or 
were expected to benefit from support schemes.  
The massive support measures influence worldwide capital flows in various ways: by affecting the 
pattern of entry and exit in globalized sectors such as finance and automobiles or via direct governmental 
participation in firms’ investment decisions by virtue of control rights conferred by shareholdings 
acquired as part of crisis response policies.   
 
Emergency measures pose a serious threat to open investment  
While emergency measures have almost certainly influenced international capital flows, their 
discriminatory or protectionist intent or effect is less certain. Indeed, the design and implementation of 
emergency measures varies significantly among countries. In addition, the determination of what is non-
discriminatory treatment can be a subtle one, especially in the financial sector. Under OECD investment 
dialogue, policies such as "fit" and "proper" tests of general application, financial requirements for non-
residents’ branches equivalent to levels applied to domestic entities, rules for consolidated supervision 
and the non-extension of emergency lending facilities to non-residents' branches are not necessarily 
considered discriminatory. Under this approach4, the OECD inventory finds that most crisis response 
schemes are designed to be non-discriminatory, i.e. they are de jure designed to be open to participation 
by foreign-controlled companies.  
However, even those support schemes that are de jure open to foreign controlled enterprises may be 
administered in a discriminatory manner. Crisis response poses a dilemma for policy makers – they need 
to take action, but most options for crisis response pose grave risks for public sector transparency and 
market competition. The implementation of most schemes involved significant discretion for the 
implementing authorities; many governments participated directly in one-on-one negotiations with 
companies on conditions for rescue or mergers – over 100 business-government negotiations are recorded 
in the OECD inventory. While confidential, one-on-one negotiations may have helped protect companies 
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involved in rescue negotiations, they are also inherently non-transparent and may cover discrimination 
and complicate public scrutiny of such measures.  
 
The risk of discrimination has not abated – ‘exit’ is the next challenge 
The “exit” phase of crisis response involves the dismantling of policies and the unwinding of stakes 
in companies acquired in the course of crisis management. The OECD inventory shows that the 
introduction of new crisis response schemes has significantly slowed, and exit from emergency measures, 
especially in the financial sector, has begun in some countries. However, the risks of discriminatory 
treatment of foreign controlled enterprises have not declined. 
Ongoing implementation of rescue and support schemes perpetuates the abovementioned risks, albeit 
arguably at a smaller scale as rescue operations of most large companies are concluded. New risks arise in 
the exit phase that is only just beginning: governments that have acquired financial positions will decide 
on the timing and modalities of divestments and will have to select from among the potential acquirers of 
the assets. The risks from governments’ discretion in administering the exit process raise concerns similar 
to those of the rescues of large financial institutions in the early stages of the crisis. Furthermore, until the 
public financial positions in companies are unwound, governments will also need to manage tensions 
between their roles as owners of companies and their roles in regulation, taxation and law-enforcement. 
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